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Abstract
This paper presents an econometric analysis of firm and industry characteristics
conducive to cooperation with universities, using Community Innovation Survey (I) data for
Belgium. We find that large firms are more likely to have cooperative agreements with
universities. These agreements are formed whenever risk is not an important obstacle to
innovation and typically serve to share costs. Consistent with the open science paradigm, we
find no evidence for the importance of the capacity to appropriate the returns from innovation
for explaining cooperative agreements with universities. We argue that cooperating with
universities is complementary to other innovation activities such as performing own R&D,
sourcing public information and cooperative agreements with suppliers and customers.
Therefore, the decision to cooperate with universities cannot be analyzed in isolation from a
firm’s overall innovation strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
Theoretical and empirical work in innovation economics suggests that industry-
science relations positively affect innovation performance through the use of scientific
knowledge (see Kline and Rosenberg, 1986: Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994; Feller, 1990;
Mowery, 1998; Mansfield, 1995). However, especially in Europe, there seems to be a gap
between high scientific performance on the one hand and industrial competitiveness on the
other hand. This gap, mainly attributed to low levels of Industry Science Links, is known as
the “European paradox” (EC-DGECFIN, 2000). To tackle this “European Paradox” major
benchmarking exercises are set up in the EU in search of best practices to improve the
commercialisation of the EU science base by better linking Industry with Science (Polt,
2000).
The main incentive for enterprises to engage in these Industry Science Links (ISL) is
the access to know-how. The evidence from the Community Innovation Survey in the EU
(CIS-II) shows, however, that only a small fraction of innovative enterprises use science, i.e.
universities and public research labs, as an important information source in their innovation
projects: in 1996, only 4 percent of innovative enterprises used information from universities
and 3%, from public (including non-profit) research organisations for designing their
innovation projects (EC-DGECFIN, 2000). First, characteristics concerning these interactions
explain the difficulty of organizing these ISLs. The highly uncertain and non-codifiable
nature of scientific know-how results in high transaction costs and systemic failures in the
market for this know-how. In addition, ISLs are hampered by diverging objectives of the
partners while reward structures within academia are unfavourable to ISLs, (Siegel et al.,
1999). Second, due to the highly specific nature of the know-how involved, only a select set
of firms within specific industries will be interested in the scientific know-how offered by
universities or other science institutes. Science is a more important source of information for
innovation in science-based technology fields where new breakthrough innovations can be
achieved and transferred to new products and processes (i.e. radical innovations)1. 
These relations between enterprises and public science institutions can take various
forms. Among these, collaborative research has received a lot of attention, because
effectively transferring scientific knowledge requires direct interaction of people. But, again,
1 For instance, using the same CIS-II survey data, 31% of “Novel Innovators” give science as an important
source of information, compared to 4% on average  (EC-DGECFIN 2000).evidence from the Community Innovation Survey for the EU shows that only 10% of
innovative firms have cooperative agreements with universities (EC-DGECFIN, 2000).
Similarly, Hall, Link & Scott (2000) report that in the US the vast majority of research
partnerships registered under the NCRA and NCRPA act do not include a university.
Although the trend is rising, only a modest 15% of all research partnerships involve a
university. 
Because Industry Science collaboration seems to encounter such obstacles many
countries have launched a variety of public promotion programmes supporting collaborative
research between industry and public science institutions. Specific financial support for
collaborative research receives the largest portion of public money for ISL promotion and is
still gaining in importance in most countries. The EU framework programmes for research
and technology development also follow this line of ISL promotion and represent major
additional funding for collaborative research. Likewise, in the US, the Advanced Technology
Program (ATP) provides direct funding for pre-competitive generic cooperative research. 
A key factor affecting the quality and extent of collaborative research between
science and industry is the demand side for scientific knowledge. Polt (2000) concludes, in
line with the “European Paradox” doctrine, that within the EU lower levels of ISLs and
relatively little cooperation between science and industry typically do not reflect a lack in
supply of scientific knowledge. Low levels of ISLs in EU member states can be attributed
mainly to a lack of demand on the enterprise side. 
The aim of our paper is to study the demand side for ISL and, more particularly, for
cooperative agreements between science and industry. Using EUROSTAT/CIS-I survey data
for Belgium, we present an econometric analysis of the firm and industry characteristics most
conducive to cooperation with universities. Such analysis may provide some insights into
barriers from the industry side to engage in cooperative agreements with universities.
Compared with existing studies, we extend the dimensions to be considered beyond size and
industry affiliates to include the issues of appropriability and complementarity with other
innovative strategies of firms. On the one hand, appropriation issues might affect the
formation of cooperative agreements with universities. Firms might worry about actually
appropriating any returns from these agreements with universities; or, conversely,
low appropriability may stimulate the formation of these agreements because firms
internalise the positive externality caused by these spillovers. On the other hand, cooperative
agreements with universities do not stand on their own. Firms that are more open to public
information sources are also more likely to interact with universities. Knowledge obtained
through these interactions needs to be integrated within the firm’s innovation process. And to
successfully commercialise inventions made, firms engage in complementary innovation
activities such as generating sufficient absorptive capacity to internalise this knowledge and
organizing applied R&D projects with customers and suppliers to exploit it.
In line with existing studies, we find that large firms are more likely to have
cooperative agreements with universities than small firms. These agreements are formed
whenever risk is not an important obstacle to innovation and typically serve to share costs.
Nevertheless, firms with foreign headquarters are less likely to be actively involved in
industry-science links in Belgium. More interestingly, the data are consistent with a
complementarity between R&D cooperation with universities and other innovation strategies
of firms, such as performing own R&D, sourcing freely available public information and
cooperative agreements with suppliers and customers. We do not find evidence of the
importance of strong appropriation conditions for cooperative agreements with universities.
2Section 2 describes the literature on R&D cooperation between industry and science,
while Section 3 discusses our research approach. Section 4 presents the results regarding the
firm and industry characteristics most conducive to cooperation in R&D with universities,
and Section 5 concludes.
2. R&D Cooperation between Science & Industry 
In the absence of a wide literature on the specific topic of R&D cooperation between
industry and science, we start with the more abundant literature on R&D cooperation in
general. Although this serves as useful benchmark, cooperation between industry & science
poses some specific issues, which will be dealt with in more detail.
A first approach to better understand why firms choose to cooperate in R&D is
offered by Transaction Cost Economics. Pisano (1990) describes alliances as a hybrid form
of organisation between hierarchical transactions within the firm and arms-length
transactions in the market place. Arm’s length technology transactions can have high
(transaction) costs. Own development within the firm limits these transaction costs, but
prevents access to specialist know-how in other firms. Collaboration allows access to this
specialised know-how, while at the same time allowing for a transfer of technology at lower
transaction costs as compared to arm’s length. It not only allows for a better control and
monitoring of technology transfers, but also the inherent reciprocity relationship
and “hostage” exchange between complementary partners minimizes opportunism. However,
information asymmetries and the uncertain and tacit nature of R&D may also in this case
endanger the exploitation of cooperative benefits. But rather than turn to contracts to
minimize the incentives for opportunism in cooperation, firms view alliances as a learning
experience and only gradually build up commitment (Mody, 1993) or enter into larger
networks of alliances, selecting partners where reputation matters more and where
complementarity is maximized (Gulati, 1995). Also, the property rights approach in an
incomplete contract framework predicts under which conditions common ownership of R&D
projects will prevail.2
The Industrial Organisation literature on R&D cooperation focuses on the effect of
imperfect appropriability of results from the innovation process on the incentives to innovate,
when firms cooperate in R&D (e.g. Katz, 1986; Spence, 1984; d’Aspremont & Jacquemin,
1988; Kamien, Muller & Zang, 1992). On the one hand, imperfect appropriability increases
the benefits from cooperative R&D agreements. R&D spillovers will lead to own cost or
demand effects, increasing the incentives for R&D cooperation through the internalisation of
the positive externality. Information sharing further increases the profitability of R&D
cooperation. When spillovers are high enough, i.e. above a critical level, cooperating firms
will spend more on R&D and will be increasingly more profitable compared to non-
cooperating firms (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; De Bondt, 1997).
On the other hand, imperfect appropriability increases the incentive of firms to free ride on
each other’s R&D investments (e.g. Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Kesteloot and Veugelers,
1995) and encourages free-riding on the R&D efforts of the research joint venture by
3
2 Aghion & Tirole (1994), for instance, discuss the organisation of R&D activities, i.e. the choice of
integration versus non-integration between a firm and its R&D contractor.  These RJVs are to be
distinguished from “horizontal” RJVs, which raise “a host of other fascinating issues concerning free riding,
allocation of ownership rights as well as control rights over the research process and antitrust policy” (p
1206).outsiders to the cooperative agreement (Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999). Recent extensions of
these models take into account that firms may manage these spillover levels actively to
maximally capitalize on the benefits from R&D cooperation. Firms attempt to increase
incoming spillovers not only directly through information sharing, but also indirectly by
investing in own R&D. The notion of “absorptive capacity” introduced by Cohen &
Levinthal (1989) and further explored in Kamien & Zang (2000) stresses the importance of a
stock of prior knowledge to effectively absorb spillovers, while cooperating. 
To  what extent can the results from the literature on cooperation in R&D, which
focuses mainly on collaboration among firms, be extended to collaboration between firms
and universities? Will the specific nature of the know-how being transacted generate a
different profile of firms engaging in these types of cooperation? The specific contribution of
science to industrial innovation is easy to explain when looking at the type of knowledge
typically offered by science and the demand for such knowledge in the innovation cycle.
Science institutions offer new technical and methodical knowledge which is mainly needed in
innovation activities oriented towards developing new technologies, new materials, new
devices and for products very new to the market. These activities take place in the early
stages of the innovation process, characterised by high technological uncertainty and still low
demand for the outcomes of innovation activities.
Given the specific characteristics of scientific knowledge, R&D cooperation
between universities and industry is characterised by high uncertainty, high information
asymmetries between partners, high transaction costs for knowledge exchange requiring the
presence of absorptive capacity on each side of the market transfer, high spillovers to other
market actors (i.e. a low level of appropriation of benefits out of the knowledge acquired),
and restrictions for financing knowledge production and exchange activities due to risk-
averse and short-term oriented financial markets. In addition, minimizing opportunistic
partner behavior in cooperative contracts will be more difficult when the technology is
characterized by a large amount of uncertainty. Nevertheless, the more generic nature of
research projects with universities and research institutes involves fewer appropriation issues,
as compared to the more commercially sensitive content when cooperating in later
development stages, with customers/suppliers and a fortiori with competitors (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002). Also Hall, Link & Scott (2001) note that when research results are
uncertain, neither party can define meaningful boundaries for any resulting Intellectual
Property, and hence appropriation is less likely to be an insurmountable issue.
Econometric studies of R&D cooperation between firms and science indicate the
importance of firm size and own R&D as drivers for cooperation. This is reminiscent of
the absorptive capacity idea, which stresses the need to have in-house (technological) power
to optimally benefit from R&D cooperation. Leiponen (2001) obtains a positive size effect
and also a positive research competence effect of R&D collaborations with universities from
Finnish innovation survey data. Adams, Chiang & Jensen (2000) also report a larger size and
larger R&D effect for firms that are linked to federal labs via cooperative R&D. The
importance of size and R&D intensity is very much in line with the results from the studies
on R&D cooperation in general. They also find strong evidence that the size and R&D
orientation of firms is beneficial to R&D cooperation (o.a. Röller et al., 1997; Kleinknecht &
van Reijnen, 1992; Colombo & Gerrone, 1996; Hagedoorn, Link & Vonortas, 2000 for an
overview). Nevertheless, Mohnen & Hoareau (2002) do not find R&D intensity to be
significantly related to cooperation with universities. They do find that size, government
support, patenting and scientific industry status contribute positively towards explaining
R&D collaborations with universities relative to other types of cooperation. Capron &
4Cincera (2002) also confirm the importance of firm size and government support as
significant drivers for R&D cooperation with universities. 
None of these papers, when assessing causes and effects, properly accounts for the
simultaneity between own R&D and R&D cooperation arising from complementarity.
Colombo & Gerrone (1996), testing the Granger causality between a firm’s R&D intensity
and its technology co-operative agreements, conclude that a simultaneous treatment of in-
house R&D intensity and technological co-operation is the appropriate framework. Veugelers
(1997), taking into account this simultaneous relationship, finds that firms which spend more
on internal R&D have a significantly higher probability of co-operation in R&D and that
once correction has been made for this, size (which typically positively influences internal
R&D) is no longer relevant for explaining R&D co-operation. Kaiser (2002), using a
simultaneous equations framework, finds a positive but only weakly significant effect of
cooperation on own R&D expenditures. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) provide evidence of
a strong positive effect of own R&D activities on cooperation in R&D, but after controlling
for endogeneity this effect is less significant. 
Beyond the simultaneous relationship between own R&D and cooperation in R&D,
there are few studies which consider complementarity with other innovation activities for
cooperating firms. Liebeskind et al. (1996) uncovered that, in the biotech sector, companies
that were engaged in joint research and publishing with academic institutions were more
effective at externally sourcing new scientific knowledge. Arora and Gambardella (1990)
examine the complementarity among external sourcing strategies of large firms in the
biotechnology industry. They study four types of external sourcing strategies for large
chemical and pharmaceutical companies in biotechnology (agreements with other firms, with
universities, investments in and acquisitions of new biotechnology firms). They find evidence
of complementarity between all types of external sourcing strategies, even after correcting for
a set of firm characteristics. Furthermore, the correction for firm characteristics suggests that
large firms with higher internal knowledge, measured by number of patents, are more
actively involved in pursuing a combination of strategies of external linkages. 
Also with respect to the appropriability issue, there is little explicit empirical
evidence. Hall, Link & Scott (2001), using survey evidence from a small subset of ATP
funded projects, demonstrate that Intellectual Property Rights issues between firms and
universities do exist and in some cases those issues represent an insurmountable barrier,
preventing R&D cooperative agreements from being formed in the first place. Such situations
are more likely to occur when the expected duration of the research is relatively short term
and thus more certain in terms of the characteristics of the research findings. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find that better appropriability of results of the
innovation process increases the probability of cooperating with customers or suppliers, but
is unrelated to cooperative agreements with research institutes. Commercially sensitive
information, which is the result of these more applied research projects, often leaks out to
competitors through common suppliers or customers. Hence, only firms that can sufficiently
protect their proprietary information are willing to engage in this type of cooperative
agreements, an issue which does not seem to be present in cooperative agreements with
research institutes.
53. The Research Design: Appropriability and Complementarity between R&D
cooperation with science and other innovation activities of the firm
We  present an econometric analysis of the firm characteristics most conducive to
cooperation with universities, using EUROSTAT/CIS-I survey data for Belgium. The
decision to cooperate or not is analyzed with a probit model. In line with the existing
literature, we include the standard explanatory variables like firm size, innovative profile or
industry affiliation. But in addition, we add appropriability conditions and take into account
the presence of complementary innovation activities. 
A standard hypothesis of the literature is that the size of enterprises may affect their
behaviour concerning cooperation with universities. Empirical evidence suggests that large
enterprises have the necessary in-house capabilities to effectively interact with science (e.g.
separate R&D departments, university-trained employees, available time and financial
resources for establishing and maintaining science links). Nevertheless, small firms may be
better placed to interact with science, for instance, because they have sprung off from
university research. The level of engagement in ISLs by SMEs strongly depends on their
absorptive capacities and their involvement in innovation activities. 
A high share of foreign-owned enterprises in the economy may be a restricting
factor to ISLs, as the national affiliates of multinational enterprises may not carry out that
type of research, which strongly relies on new scientific knowledge, i.e. strategic research
and research on completely new products, materials and technologies. However, empirical
studies have shown that foreign-owned affiliates behave very similarly to domestic-owned
enterprises in the same sector and size class (see, among others, Gerybadze & Reger, 1999).
Furthermore, foreign-owned enterprises may have R&D funds available from their parent
company. 
As work by Mariti & Smiley (1983), among others, has indicated, reasons of cost
and risk sharing are important drivers for cooperation in general. When costs are an
important obstacle to innovation, we expect to observe more cooperative agreements set up
for the purpose of cost sharing. More specifically in industry-science collaboration, given the
early-stage characteristic of the know-how involved, financial barriers to innovation may be
strong given the imperfections of the financial markets for these early-stage ventures. This is
often a reason why governments provide additional funding for industry-science
collaboration. In the case of university-industry collaboration, the innovation process is still
characterised by high technological uncertainty. Although higher risk invokes higher
transaction costs, at the same time it induces risk-sharing benefits from cooperation, resulting
in an ambiguous effect on the probability of cooperating with science. 
A first specific focus of our analysis is the impact of the appropriation regime.
Following the suggestions from the literature, the more generic nature of research projects
with universities and research institutes should involve fewer appropriation issues, as
compared to the more commercially sensitive cooperation with customers/suppliers
or competitors. We test whether the appropriation regime is a significant characteristic for
firms cooperating with universities. We distinguish between two types of protection:
legal protection of products and processes through patents, brand names or copyright; and
strategic protection of products and processes through secrecy, complexity or lead time. We
test strategic protection at the firm level and the effectiveness of legal protection as an
industry variable. 
6A second specific focus of our analysis is the consideration of other complementary
innovation activities. ISL and cooperative agreements with science institutions, in particular,
develop a firm’s basic R&D capacity. This basic R&D capacity increases the efficiency of the
applied research conducted within the firm.3 Hence, since R&D cooperation with research
institutes increases the firm’s basic research capability, which in turn increases the efficiency
of applied research, one should find a complementary relationship between own R&D and
cooperative agreements with science institutes, especially for larger firms. For this, we
include the own R&D capacity in our analysis. This is in line with prior studies providing
strong evidence that own R&D activities of firms positively affect R&D cooperation,
reminiscent of the absorptive capacity idea. We also include cooperative strategies of the firm
with customers and suppliers. These types of vertical cooperative agreements typically
involve development activities. With applied R&D capacities complementary to basic R&D
capacities that are developed in cooperative agreements with universities, we expect both
types of cooperation to be mutually reinforcing.
However, this basic R&D capacity may also stimulate the firm into other innovation
activities beyond (own) (applied) R&D. Rosenberg (1990) stresses the importance attached to
performing  basic research by companies that see it “as a ticket of admission to an
information network”. Viewed in its capacity to absorb external information efficiently into
in-house innovation activities, basic research will act as an important driver for
complementarity with other external sourcing strategies. One such external sourcing strategy
is the use of publicly available information. Knowledge disseminated through publications,
conferences and patents is a stock of knowledge that can be used by the industry as a public
good input into commercial research. The effective transfer of this know-how typically
requires a basic research capability by the receiving party, which can be built through
cooperative agreements with science institutions. Following the literature, we expect that
higher free spillovers will increase the scope for learning within cooperative R&D
agreements. Because of improved technological competence of the partners, the marginal
benefit of forming a research joint venture will be higher, implying a higher probability of
cooperation. 
In order to address the possible endogeneity problems with complementary
strategies, we will use a two-step estimation procedure. The two-step estimation procedure
consists of first regressing the complementary strategies on a set of specific assumed
exogenous variables in the first step. In the second step, we use the predicted values of the
complementary strategy variables as independent variables in the probit for cooperation with
universities.4,5 The next section details the data, the variables and the econometric
methodology used, before presenting the results. 
7
3 Cassiman, Perez-Castrillo and Veugelers (2002) develop a model on the complementarity between basic and
applied research.  They find that once leading firms start accessing external know-how by spending on basic
research as a way to create effective know-how, the ratio of basic to applied research will increase, the more
they spend on R&D.  They thus provide an explanation for why larger firms with larger applied R&D
budgets will be more inclined to be engaged in basic R&D.  Also Aghion & Howitt (1996) provide a model
on the choice between basic and applied research, favoring larger firms for basic research.  
4 In addition to being computationally less demanding, using our two-step estimation procedure provides more
robust estimates compared to simultaneously estimating the system. Simultaneous estimation, requiring a full
specification of all structural equations,  might be plagued by biases arising from omitted variables in any of
the individual equations, leading to inconsistent estimates for the whole system (see Vella and Verbeek,
1999). 
5 In order to avoid inconsistent estimates for the second step estimation in the case of a dichotomous
endogenous variable in a probit equation, which is the case for CPvert, we estimate the CPvert first step
equation as a linear probability model and use the predicted value of this variable in the second step of the
estimation (Heckman and Macurdy, 1985). 4. Cooperation in R&D between industry and science: empirical evidence from Belgian
Manufacturing
4.1. The data
The data used for this research are innovation data on Belgian manufacturing
industry that were collected as part of the Community Innovation Survey conducted by
Eurostat in the different member countries in 1993 (CIS-I). The survey was intended to
develop insights into the problems of technological innovation in manufacturing industry and
was the first of its sort organized in many of the participating countries. It contained
questions characterizing the R&D strategies of firms: whether they innovate or not, make
and/or buy technology, and cooperate or not.6 In addition, the data allow to identify motives
of and obstacles to innovation, sources of technological information, mechanisms used to
absorb know-how, as well as mechanisms used to protect the results from innovation. The
later versions of the CIS survey (CIS-II and CIS-III) are unfortunately less rich in terms of
other variables included; most notably, the appropriation of the results from innovation was
not retained in later surveys. This is why we concentrate on CIS-I. A representative sample of
1335 Belgian manufacturing firms was selected and a 13-page questionnaire sent out to them.
The response rate was higher than 50% (748). A limited non-response analysis was
conducted, where no systematic bias could be detected with respect to size and industry
affiliation.
The sample used in this study is restricted to the firms that innovate. These firms are
distinguished from those that do not innovate based on their answer to the question of
whether they were actively engaged in innovation in the previous two years (by introducing
new or improved products or processes) and returned a positive amount spent on innovation:
60% (439) of the firms in the sample claim to innovate, while only 40% do not. The non-
innovating firms did not provide information about several variables used in the analysis. In
our regression analysis we correct for sample selection using the two-step Heckman
correction.7
4.2. The variables
Our dependent variable, whether firms cooperate or not, CPuniv, is constructed from
the questionnaire where firms responded whether or not they cooperate with universities.8
Due to missing values, we are left with 374 firms that innovate, of which 106 have a
cooperative agreement with universities.9
As independent variables we include the classical factors shown in previous
literature to affect the decision to cooperate. We include SIZE, measured by the logarithm of
firm employment. Taking logarithms allows to account for a non-linear size effect. A dummy
variable FOR is included which takes the value of 1 if the firm has foreign headquarters. In
addition, the survey information analyses the importance of cost & risk-sharing motives for
cooperation with science in particular. The firms rated the importance of different obstacles
8
6 An analysis of the R&D strategies chosen by the sample firms is reported in Veugelers & Cassiman (1999).
7 Sample selection with respect to innovating firms is rejected and does not significantly affect our results (see
below).
8 The questionnaire only contains information on whether firms cooperate or not.  No information on extent
and nature of the cooperative agreement was available.
9 Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description of all the variables used in the analysis. to innovation on a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial). We construct an aggregate measure
of the responses to questions such as lack of suitable financing, high costs of innovation, long
pay-back period or difficult to control cost of innovation: COST. Similarly, RISK is the
response to the importance of high risks as a barrier to innovation. To correct for “science-
based industries”, we include industry dummies, as well as an industry level variable for
scientific cooperation10. 
The survey data allow us to focus our analysis of cooperation with universities on
the extent to which Intellectual Property Rights and the capacity of firms to protect the rents
from their innovative efforts shape their cooperative activities. In CIS-I, firms had to rate the
effectiveness of five different methods for protecting products and processes, respectively (10
different questions overall), on a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial). We distinguish
between two types of protection: legal protection of products and processes through patents,
brand names or copyright; and strategic protection of products and processes through
secrecy, complexity or lead time. We construct a variable with the mean score for these
questions to generate a measure of legal and strategic protection. However, we will only use
strategic protection as a firm-level variable on appropriability (PROTstrat). Legal protection
is an industry variable, rather than a firm-specific characteristic. The industry average
captures the technology and market characteristics that determine the legal appropriability
regime of the industry (IndPROTleg). 
A second specific focus of our analysis is the consideration of other complementary
innovation activities. First, we include own R&D capacity. The CIS-I survey for Belgium
does not provide reliable data on R&D budgets. In the absence of this, we have to resort to
other proxies. In the questionnaire, firms rated the importance of internally available
information for their innovation process on a 5-point scale from unimportant (1) to crucial
(5). The importance of internal information to innovation is included to proxy for internal
know-how capabilities, which should increase the effectiveness of absorbing externally
acquired information (INTSourcing). The problem with the measure for econometric
purposes is its low variance, since almost all firms in our sample indicate internal sources to
be important.11
Second, we examine the complementarity between cooperation with universities and
other external sourcing strategies.12 A first external sourcing strategy is the use of publicly
available information. In the questionnaire, firms rated the importance of publicly available
information for their innovation process from three sources on a 5-point scale from
unimportant (1) to crucial (5). The information sources were: patent information; specialist
conferences, meetings and publications; trade shows; and seminars. To generate a firm-
specific measure of incoming spillovers, we construct the mean of the answers on these
questions (PUBSourcing). Finally, we also include other cooperative strategies of the firm,
more particularly with clients and suppliers (CPvert). 
9
10 The industry is defined at the NACE 2 digit sector level and the industry average is the average score from
the firms responding in the sample in the same NACE 2 sector.
11 An alternative question, namely whether firms were engaged in own R&D activities, allowed to construct a
dummy variable.  But since all firms that cooperated with universities scored positively on this dummy, we
could not use this information.  Similarly, the question on the presence of permanent R&D activities only
yielded 5 non-positive observations.
12 In order to correctly test the complementarity between different innovation activities, we need to estimate the
incremental effect of combining these activities on performance. See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002b) for a
careful identification of complementarity between innovation activities.4.3. The model specification
Our basic equation to be estimated is as follows:
CPuniv =  α1 + α2SIZE + α3FOR + α4COST + α5RISK + α6PROTstrat + 
α7IndPROTleg + α8IndCPuniv + industry dummies + v1 (1)
To  check the impact of complementary innovation activities we extend the basic
specification (1) with internal R&D, through the variable INTSourcing and the two external
sourcing strategies: sourcing of publicly available information (PUBSourcing) and
cooperation with vertically related companies (CPvert). 
CPuniv =  α1 + α2SIZE + α3FOR + α4COST + α5RISK + α6PROTstrat + 
α7IndPROTleg + industry dummies +
α8 INTSourcing + α9 PUBSourcing + α10 CPvert + v2 (2)
When  INTSourcing, PUBSourcing and CPvert  are complementary innovation
strategies with CPuniv, this will imply that these variables, when included in the regression
for CPuniv, will be correlated with the error term v2, whenever we have not been able to
include all drivers of complementarity in the set of independent variables for CPuniv or only
because of common measurement error or common omitted variable bias. To tackle this
problem we will use a two-step estimation procedure, where we first regress the
complementary strategies on a set of specific assumed exogenous variables in the first step.
In the second step, we use the predicted values of the complementary strategy variables as
independent variables in the probit for cooperation with universities :
INTSourcing = b1 + b2SIZE + b3 OBSTEXTERNAL + b4OBSTRESOURCE +b5
IndINTsourcing + industry dummies + e1 (3)
PUBSourcing = c1 + c2SIZE + c3 BASICRD + c4 IndPUBsourcing + industry dummies+ e2
(4)
CPvert = d1 + d2SIZE + d3FOR + d4TECH + d5PROTstrat + d6IndPROTleg + 
d7IndCPvert + industry dummies + e3 (5)
Included as instruments for the complementary strategies are the industry averages
for each of the endogenous innovation activities. We assume that each of these industry mean
variables picks up the effects of unobserved industry-specific attributes that contribute to that
endogenous firm-specific variable.13 In addition, we include as instrument for INTSourcing
our measure of firm size as well as obstacles to innovation such as lack of internal and
external resources that are effectively preventing firms from innovating. 
10
13 For a full specification of the model and the instruments, see also Table A2 in the Appendix. For a detailed
description of the variables included, see  Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.For PUBSourcing the literature seems to suggest that absorptive capacity through
internal technological capabilities is important to optimally benefit from external information
flows. As an explanatory variable we thus include our assumed exogenous measure for
absorptive capacity: firm size. It is often argued that generic research diffuses more easily
(Vonortas, 1994; Kamien and Zang, 1998). Hence, firms that find sources of basic R&D more
important for their innovation process, relative to information sources of applied R&D, are
more likely to benefit from free public information and hence are expected to have a higher
score on PUBSourcing. The variable BasicRD measures the importance for the innovation
process of information from research institutes and universities relative to the importance of
suppliers and customers as an information source. We use this variable to proxy for the
“basicness” of R&D performed by the firm (see also Mohnen & Hoareau, 2002).14,15
As instruments for vertical cooperation, CPvert, we include, in line with cooperation
with universities, size, foreign links and industry dummies. In contrast to cooperation with
research institutes, the search for synergies and appropriation is a key issue when dealing
with more commercially sensitive information in vertical cooperative agreements (see
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). Hence we include our measures for appropriation on the firm
and industry level. We also include a measure for the lack of technological information as an
obstacle to innovation, TECH, which measures the absence of potential for synergies in
cooperative agreements and hence should work negatively on the likelihood to cooperate. 
When a firm is using a complementary innovation activity, this should stimulate the
use of cooperation with universities. Hence to capture the effect from using complementary
strategies, we expect a positive effect when including these (instrumented) strategies in the
probit for CPuniv. 
A final issue we need to deal with is a possible sample selection. As we only have
information for those firms that are innovation-active, the coefficients in the CPuniv
regression might be inconsistently estimated because of sample selection. The regression is
corrected for sample selection following a two-stage Heckman correction procedure
appropriate in the case of a probit regression. In the first stage the innovation equation is
estimated. We regress in a probit model whether the firm innovates on the following
independent variables: size, export intensity, a number of variables measuring obstacles to
innovation (cost, lack of external resources, lack of technological opportunities, lack of
demand) and industry dummies (see Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999 for a development of this
result). 
4.4. The results
Table 1 first presents some descriptive statistics about the variables used. The mean
values of all variables are significantly higher for firms cooperating with universities than for
firms without similar cooperative R&D agreements. Larger firms, firms with foreign
ownership and those being cost constrained have a higher frequency of cooperating with
11
14 The questionnaire grouped all the questions on the importance of different information sources for the
innovation process in the same subsection. Scores of the same firms should be readily comparable. Note that
by using this ratio of two scores, the potential problems of the subjectivity of these measures is reduced.
15 This is one of the variables that is likely to be endogeneous, but since the purpose of this paper is to study
the decision to cooperate and the drivers of external knowledge flows, we will assume that the research
approach chosen by the firm, i.e. the relative mix between basic and applied research, is exogenous. science. This holds also for firms that are better able to appropriate the returns from
innovation, but not for firms facing a higher risk. It seems that if risk is perceived as a barrier
to innovation, firms are less likely to cooperate with universities. This difference is not
significant however.
Table 1. Descriptive Statisticsa
Mean Mean  if  CPuniv = 0 Mean if CPuniv = 1
SIZE*** 5.12 4.76 6.16
(1.63) (1.51) (1.52)
FOR*** 0.37 0.33 0.48
(0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
COST** 0.49 0.47 0.52
(0.20) (0.20) (0.18)
RISK 0.48 0.49 0.47
(0.27) (0.28) (0.25)
PROTstrat*** 3.30 3.2 3.58
(0.96) (1.03) (0.65)
IndPROTleg*** 1.91 1.86 2.07
(0.36) (0.31) (0.46)
INTsourcing*** 3.88 3.79 4.13
(0.96) (1.02) (0.71)
PUBsourcing*** 2.85 2.75 3.12
(0.73) (0.73) (0.66)
CPvert*** 0.30 0.19 0.60
(0.46) (0.39) (0.49)
*** Difference in means between cooperating and non-cooperating firms significant at 1 percent
** Significant at 5 percent
* Significant at 10 percent
a Standard deviations in parentheses
As suggested by our hypothesis of complementarity with other innovation activities,
the mean importance of INTsourcing, PUBsourcing and CPvert is significantly higher for
firms cooperating with universities compared to firms without these cooperative agreements.
Further evidence consistent with complementarity among innovation activities is offered by
examining the correlation between these different innovation activities. Table 2 reveals that
all these innovation activities are significantly positively correlated. 
12Table 2. Pairwise Correlations between Innovation Activities
Cpuniv CPvert INTsourcing PUBsourcing
CPuniv 1
CPvert 0.399 1
INTsourcing 0.158 0.150 1
PUBsourcing 0.236 0.238 0.215 1
All correlations are significant at 1%
Table 3 presents the results from the probit regressions. Regression (1) shows our
base regression without accounting for any complementary innovation activities. As expected
and in line with previous studies, SIZE positively affects the likelihood of cooperating with
universities. Foreign ownership, FOR, once corrected for other characteristics, has a negative
effect on cooperation with universities. Foreign subsidiaries are, therefore, less likely to be
involved in ISL in Belgium, all else equal. Although these foreign subsidiaries form part of
the multinationals’ innovation system, they are typically involved in the more applied R&D
activities while the central R&D department at headquarters remains more involved in basic
R&D and associated ISLs. When costs are an important obstacle to innovation, innovating
firms have a strongly significant higher probability of engaging in cooperative agreements
with universities (COST). While cost-sharing seems to be an important driver of cooperation,
risk-sharing is not. Firms for which risk is an important barrier to innovate are actually less
likely to cooperate with universities (RISK). Viewed from a transaction cost perspective this
result is not so surprising. Therefore, it seems important to distinguish between costs and
risks when analyzing the cooperation decision. Substituting COST and  RISK with an
independent variable that combines cost and risk factors, as is frequently done in the
literature, results in an insignificant parameter estimate. Finally, neither strategic nor legal
protection affects the likelihood of engaging in cooperation with universities (PROTstrat,
IndPROTleg). These results indicate that appropriation does not seem to preoccupy firms










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14In the following regressions we include different complementary innovation
activities sequentially16. We start with own R&D. In regression (2) we include internal
information sources as a proxy for own R&D capacity (INTsourcing). Own R&D capacity
positively affects the decision to cooperate with universities, although this is only significant
at 10%. As the existing literature indicates, there is a strong presumption of endogeneity of
this variable. Correcting for potential endogeneity, we find that there is no effect of own
R&D capacity (regression (3)), confirming previous studies.17 However, we suspect that this
effect is driven by collinearity between SIZE and  INTsourcing due to our correction
procedure, rather than because own R&D capacity has no effect on cooperation with
universities. Regression (4) shows that when dropping SIZE, our corrected measure of own
R&D capacity is highly significant. We therefore conclude that SIZE seems to be a good
proxy for the form’s own R&D and absorptive capacity and decide to drop INTsourcing from
our subsequent regressions. Note that this by no means indicates that own R&D capacity is
inconsequential for university cooperation. On the contrary, the difficulty of finding an
alternative measure for own R&D capacity which did not perfectly predict cooperation with
universities indicates a strong complementarity between cooperation and own R&D (see
footnote 11), actually too strong to be able to assess econometrically. 
In regressions (5) and (6) we add two other external sourcing strategies,
PUBsourcing and CPvert, to our base regression. Both the importance of publicly available
information for the innovation process and cooperative agreements with customers and
suppliers are positively related with cooperation with universities. This result suggests
complementarity between different innovation activities. Obviously, these variables are
plagued by endogeneity.18 Correcting for endogeneity (regression (7)), the importance of
PUBsourcing increases spectacularly, both in significance and in quantitative effect on the
decision to cooperate. The positive effect of vertical cooperation, however, is lost after the
correction. Either vertical cooperation, properly accounted for, is not complementary to
cooperation with universities, or our correction badly predicts vertical cooperation and the
predicted value is therefore a bad instrument. In order to discriminate between these two
alternative explanations of our results we resort to an alternative empirical strategy. We
jointly estimate CPuniv and  CPvert as a bivariate probit. If these activities are truly
complementary the joint estimation would correct for this joint determination. Table 4
presents these results. Regressions (1) and (2) are the uncorrected bivariate probit regressions
for CPuniv and CPvert. In regressions (3) and (4) we correct PUBsourcing for endogeneity as
we did in the previous case. First, it is interesting to note that the results of regressions (1)
and (3) on CPuniv confirm our results in Table 3 (regressions (5) and (7)) on the drivers of
cooperation with universities. Furthermore, the correlation between CPuniv and CPvert is
positive and highly significant, confirming the complementarity between these innovation
activities. Our independent variables, however, are unable to explain this correlation, as the
remaining error terms are still highly correlated. Therefore, constructing from these results a
predicted  CPvert variable is unlikely to pick up the elements driving the observed
complementarity between cooperation with universities and cooperation with suppliers and
customers. In the absence of a good explanatory model, the predicted CPvert in Table 3
(regression (7)) is therefore expected to show up insignificant. 
15
16 The results on the “base” variables remain robust across the various specifications.
17 See Table A2 in the Appendix for the instruments used. Alternative specifications gave very similar results.
18 See Table A2 in the Appendix for the IV-regression.Table 4. Bivariate Probit CPuniv and Cpvert
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CPuniv CPvert CPuniv CPvert
SIZE 0.375*** 0.24*** 0.184** 0.262***
(0.0687) (0.582) (0.0812) (0.0704)
FOR -0.344* -0.144 -0.366* -0.159
(0.193) (0.175) (0.20) (0.175)
COST 1.199** 1.003*
(0.53) — (0.535) —
RISK -1.172*** -0.884**
(0.383) — (0.389) —
TECH — -0.422 -0.370
(0.335) — (0.331)
PROTstrat 0.095 0.190** 0.133 0.229**
(0.11) (0.096) (0.111) (0.094)
IndPROTleg -0.302 -0.562 -1.657** -0.738
(0.731) (1.428) (0.737) (1.547)
IndCPuniv 4.487*** 5.382***
(1.322) — (1.318) —
IndCPvert — 4.163** 4.655**
(2.09) — (2.187)
PUBsourcing 0.305** 0.20* 2.854*** -0.0687
(0.134) (0.117) (0.603) (0.494)
Constant -4.164*** -2.943 -7.972*** -2.262
(1.204) (1.985) (1.482) (2.266)
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included




*** Significant at 1 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, * Significant at 10 percent
An interesting result, nevertheless, is the significant positive effect of strategic
protection for vertical cooperation in regressions (2) and (4) in Table 4.19 While appropriation
does not seem to affect the decision to cooperate with universities, the regressions for CPvert
indicate that the more applied R&D agreements with customers and suppliers do take into
consideration the potential loss of appropriability before engaging in such an agreement. This
different result accentuates the open information environment in which cooperative
agreements with universities take place, in contrast with other cooperative agreements.
16
19 This effect can also be noted in the correction use for CPvert in Table A2 in the Appendix. See also
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002).Finally, we check our results for possible sample selection. Regression (8) in Table 3
applies a Heckman procedure for probit regressions. We estimate a selection equation for
whether the firms innovate or not, and adjust the original probit regression of CPuniv for this
outcome.20 Both SIZE and COST have smaller point estimates and are less significant after
correcting for sample selection. Both these variables strongly account for the decision to
innovate. But, as can be observed, our remaining estimates are affected little by this selection
and sample selection is actually rejected by the data.
5. Conclusions
In line with the “European Paradox” doctrine which attributes low levels of Industry
Science Links in Europe to a lack of demand from the enterprise sector, this paper studies the
demand side for ISLs and more particularly for cooperative agreements in R&D between
firms and universities. We present an econometric analysis on the firm and industry
characteristics most conducive to cooperation with universities, using EUROSTAT/CIS I data
from Belgian manufacturing firms. 
In line with previous studies we find large firms to be more likely to have
cooperative agreements with universities. In the econometric analysis, it turns out that firm
size seems to be the better measure for own absorptive R&D capacity of the firm, at least in
the absence of a better measure for own R&D with sufficient variance among innovative
firms. Furthermore, firms with foreign headquarters are less likely to be actively involved in
industry science links in Belgium, which is consistent with MNEs keeping basic R&D, which
is more prone to ISL, centralized at the headquarter level. Firms impeded by costs to innovate
are more likely to cooperate with universities, attracted by the cost-sharing option from
cooperation. However, risk sharing was not found to be associated with cooperation with
universities. This could be related to the higher transaction costs for cooperative agreements
in highly uncertain R&D projects. 
In line with the Industrial Organisation models on R&D cooperation, we also
examine the impact of appropriation of know-how on the incentives to engage in R&D
cooperation with universities. We find that the capacity to effectively protect the returns from
innovations is not a significant factor for cooperation with universities. This confirms the
importance of a perspective of open, non-exclusive exchange when cooperating with
scientists in basic exploratory cooperative research. This is in contrast with cooperative
agreements with suppliers and customers, where the effectiveness of strategic protection
mechanims is a highly significant factor, since commercially sensitive information, which is
the result of these more applied research projects, may leak out to competitors through
common suppliers or customers.  
Cooperative agreements with universities are typically embedded in a wider
innovative strategy of the firm. We find consistent evidence of a complementary relationship,
for firms cooperating with universities, with other innovation activities such as using public
information as an important information source for innovation. Also, the complementarity
with other cooperative agreements, notably with suppliers and customers, is confirmed in the
data.
17
20 See Table A2 in the Appendix for the result of the innovation selection equation.Overall the results seem to suggest that the low frequency of cooperative agreements
with universities in Belgian manufacturing may be related to an industry structure that is
characterized by a high share of small and medium-sized firms whose R&D activities are
concentrated more on development projects, rather than the more basic research projects
where the link with science is more apparent. The fact that a lot of large firms in the Belgian
manufacturing sector are typically subsidiaries of foreign firms also contributes to lower
levels of ISLs. Furthermore, a too narrow portfolio of innovative activities of Belgian firms
implies a lack of complementary innovation activities, which would stimulate cooperation
with universities. 
Before these results are molded into firm policy conclusions, more work is needed
both empirically and theoretically. Empirical work, replicating the results across countries
and across time, is needed. More importantly, the analysis should be extended, beyond
whether cooperation occurs or not, towards assessing the efficiency of such cooperation and
its impact on innovative performance and growth. We also need new insights from theory to
be better able to assess which capacities firms need to master in-house in order to engage
effectively in cooperation with science. This would allow to derive better proxies for internal
R&D capabilities and find better drivers for complementarity among innovation activities.
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20Appendix
Table A1. The Variables
Dependent Variables
CPuniv CPuniv = 1, if firms cooperate with Universities. 
CPvert CPvert = 1, if firms cooperate with (1) Suppliers, or
(2) Customers.
INTsourcing Importance of Internal Information Sources of the
firm for Innovation (number between 1
(unimportant) and 5 (crucial)).
PUBsourcing Mean score of importance of following information
sources for innovation process (number between 1
(unimportant) and 5 (crucial)): (1) Patent
information, (2) Specialized conferences, meetings
and publications, (3) Trade shows and seminars.
Independent Variables
SIZE Natural Logarithm of Number of Employees in
1992 in 10,000
FOR FOR =1, if the firm has foreign headquarters.
COST Sum of scores of importance of following obstacles
to innovation process (number between 1
(unimportant) and 5 (crucial)): (1) No suitable
financing available, (2) High costs of innovation,
(3) Pay-back period too long, (4) Innovation cost
hard to control (rescaled between 0 and 1).
RISK Importance of high risks as an obstacle to
innovation (number between 1 (unimportant) and 5
(crucial), rescaled between 0 and 1).
PROTstrat Average measure of effectiveness of secrecy,
complexity and/or lead time as a protection
measure of innovation (on scale 1 (unimportant) to
5 (crucial)).
IndProtleg Average measure of effectiveness of patents or
registration of brands as a protection measure of
innovation (on scale 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial)).
IndCPuniv Mean of CPuniv at industry level. Industry level is
defined at 2-digit NACE.
Industry Dummies Industry dummies are included where the industry
is defined as groupings of NACE 2-digit level
industries.
21Appendix (continued)
Table A1. The Variables (continuation)
Instrumental Variables INTsourcing
OBSTEXTERNAL Mean of score of scores on Importance of lack of
external technical services, lack of cooperation
opportunities with other companies, and lack of
technological opportunities.
OBSTRESOURCE Mean of score of scores on Importance of lack of
innovation personnel, lack of technical personnel,
lack of information about technologies, and lack of
market information as barrier to innovation (on
scale 1 (unimportant) to 5 (crucial)).
IndINTsourcing Mean of INTsourcing at industry level. Industry
level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
Instrumental Variables PUBsourcing
BASICRD Measure of importance for the innovation process
of information from research institutes and
universities relative to the importance of suppliers
and customers as an information source.
IndPUBsourcing Mean of PUBsourcing at industry level. Industry
level is defined at 2-digit NACE.
Instrumental Variables CPvert
TECH Importance of lack of technological information as
an obstacle to innovation, (number between 1
(unimportant) and 5 (crucial), rescaled between 0
and 1)).
IndCPvert Mean of CPvert at industry level. Industry level is
defined at 2-digit NACE.
Selection Equation Innovation
INNOV INNOV=1 if firm developed or introduced new or
improved products or processes in the last 2 years
AND reported a positive budget for innovation
expenditures.
OBSTTECHNOLOGY Importance of lack of technological opportunities as
barrier to innovation (on scale 1 (unimportant) to 5
(crucial)).
EXPINT Export Intensity in 1992 (Exports/Sales x 0.1).
OBSTINTEREST Importance of lack of interest by customers for new
products as an obstacle to innovation (number
between 1 (unimportant) and 5 (crucial)).
22Appendix (continued)
Table A2. Correction for Endogeneity and Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INTsourcing PUBsourcing CPvert INNOV
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (Probit)
SIZE 0.089*** 0.0711*** 0.0745*** 0.322***




(0.069) — — (0.10)
OBSTRESOURCE -0.134*
(0.073) — — —
BASICRD — 0.503*** — —
(0.118)
FOR —— -0.0482 0.0984
(0.053) (0.194)
TECH —— -0.092 —
(0.094)
PROTstrat —— 0.0458* —
(0.025)
IndPROTleg —— -0.0779 —
(0.131)
EXPINT —— — 0.728***
(0.223)





(0.18) — — —
IndPUBsourcing — 0.862*** — —
(0.138)
IndCPvert —— 0.961*** —
(0.248)
IndInnov —— — 1.476**
(0.666)
Constant -0.355 -0.306 -0.261 -1.835***
(0.718) (0.387) (0.249) (0.587)
Industry Dummies —— Included Included
F(4,395)=11.39*** F(3,422)=30.37*** F(21,366)=4.5*** Rho = 0.0657
Adj R2 =0.094 Adj R2 =0.172 Adj R2 =0.159 χ2(24)=74.22***
N=400 N=426 N=388 N=504
*** Significant at 1 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, * Significant at 10 percent
23